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Abstract:  The contemporary confluence of globalization and ethical pluralism is at the origin of many ethical challenges that confront us nowadays, both in practice and in theory. One of the challenges arising from the development of globalization, has to do with respect for cultural diversity. It is often said that the success of economic globalization tends towards social and cultural homogeneity. To the extent that cultural diversity is usually seen as a valuable reality, that global trend seems to contradict our efforts to respect ethical pluralism, both personal and cultural, within society. In this paper I argue that a) ethical minimalism, despite its emphasis on tolerance and justice, does not take pluralism seriously into account in present-day society, and b) ethical minimalism is not suited to balance the homogenizing trend of globalization. Certainly ethical norms are necessary, but by no means are they sufficient in themselves to encourage either justice or tolerance; nor are they sufficient to inspire and encourage good practices and sound regulations. Instead, a virtue-based ethic has the capacity of inspiring and encouraging good practices. Particularly, a virtue-based ethic is able to inspire a serious dialogue about ethical and legal issues both in the public arena and within organizations. 











Two topics are put together in this paper’s title: globalization and pluralism. They are usually chosen to describe our present situation, whereby such combination entails a particular ethical challenge for us, namely, is it possible to expand business while respecting cultural diversity? To what extent is ethical pluralism compatible with globalization of business? 
In order to answer these questions we should begin by clarifying our concepts: what do we mean when we characterize our present situation using terms such as global business and ethical pluralism? 
Indeed, assuming that the adjective “global” refers mainly to business, it is clear that, at least theoretically, a plural society doesn’t need to be global. I say “theoretically” because in practice it is hardly possible that a society without international business can be plural at all. Throughout history, business has been a source of cultural exchanges, and consequently of plurality. In this respect, one interesting thing about globalization, such as this term is understood today​[1]​, is that it seems to entail a tendency towards social and even cultural homogeneity. This is the case at least in developed countries​[2]​. If we regard the existence of a plurality of cultures as valuable, then we are raising an ethical question. The ethical question, however, is not whether globalization is good or not, but whether its negative effects –and particularly such cultural homogenizing trend- can be controlled, and how.  
On the other hand, global business doesn’t necessarily involve creating a single political society, at least theoretically speaking. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that whenever we speak of business, we are speaking of human actions and human relationships, and, therefore, of ethics. This is true not only for individuals, but also for corporations. Contrary to Donaldson​[3]​, who holds corporations to be merely “economic animals,” I concur with Solomon​[4]​, Bowie​[5]​, and Enderle​[6]​ that corporations can be seen –in fact they have to be seen- as ethical agents, since their movements rest finally upon human decisions, which can be good or not. Now, politics and law are seminally involved in ethics: the fact that we enter in contact with different peoples generates by itself certain demands of justice and humanity. As regards to this ethical demand, the Romans spoke of ius gentium. We surely need much more sophisticated regulations than theirs, given the “international disorder” created after the end of the Cold War. After such time when the international peace rested on a Hobbessian model, the present situation seems to evolve towards a Kantian model, where law, and not merely balance of powers, should have the last word. In any case, what is certain is that ethical reason demands to fill legal gaps, whenever we find them. And yet, we should keep in mind that regulations alone are not sufficient from an ethical point of view. Ethics involves much more than creating rules and laws. 
By “ethics” I mean a kind of practical knowledge which cannot be reduced either to theoretical models or to “prudential” calculations (as long as we take “prudence” not in the Aristotelian but in the Kantian sense, such as Bowie does​[7]​). As practical knowledge, ethics serves to direct our conduct by introducing order in the way we look for certain goods (for instance economic benefits). This “order” is basically built upon the subjection to certain norms and the development of moral virtue. 
I hold virtue to be the key concept in ethics, and by extension in business ethics​[8]​, since virtue refers directly to the integral good of the human agent, which is the only good we can really achieve in every situation in life -even if we don’t achieve any other. Virtue is also necessary from an intellectual point of view, in order to recognize opportunities to do some good; for without moral virtue we wouldn’t even know when and how to apply norms. 
Of course, the priority of virtue doesn’t mean the exclusion of norms. In  fact, grounding ethics on virtue alone could almost sound narcissistic. Norms are certainly necessary. They make it clear that there are boundaries beyond which we turn to be simply unjust. However, not to be unjust does not mean immediately that we are positively just. Being just involves much more than avoiding inflicting harm to others. It is much more than the subjection to certain conventions, however important they may be.
In the present situation of global business, it is clear that there is a need for some kind of regulation –what Cavanagh calls “political counterbalance”​[9]​-, which can prevent our societies from becoming arenas where only the strongest can prevail. But this need should not lead us to rely on norm-ethics alone (whether inferred or constructed)​[10]​-, and rejecting a virtue-based approach based. Rather, it is the focus on virtues that, among other things, can prevent us from the supposedly homogeneity resulting from economic globalization, since virtue -being the key concept in every theory of the good life, is what makes a life valuable. After all, economy, by its very nature, fails to transcend the issue of merely living. By itself, it has nothing to tell us about what makes a life valuable or good. Consequently, the prevalence of economy in a society represents the prevalence of survival criteria over criteria about the good life. 
I am aware that in the present situation of ethical pluralism, some may be tempted to embrace a kind of minimalist approach to ethical issues.  This is, for instance, the approach taken by Donaldson. In an article entitled “The Language of International Corporate Ethics,” he says explicitly that “languages based in rights and duties, avoidance of harm, or social contracts are better for understanding international corporate ethics than ones based in virtues, self-control, or the maximization of human happiness”​[11]​.
I wonder why. I don’t see any relation in stressing virtue and neglecting norms. Virtue encourages us to seek norms whenever they are necessary. But norms alone are not enough to implement good actions, since once the norm is known, we still have to discover when and how to apply it. And this is a matter of prudence, which cannot exist without moral virtue. 
Certainly, at first glance, minimalist ethics may seem a better way of respecting personal autonomy and of avoiding conflicts arising from cultural or ethical differences. But is this first impression true?

In this paper, I argue that norm-based ethics is insufficient in itself, since it usually reduces ethics to an intellectual enterprise aiming to clarify what the correct action is here and now. In doing so, norm-based ethics forgets the practical dimension of ethics: the fact that knowing how to act here and now requires virtue. The intellectual enterprise directed to learn how to act here and know is not separable from the practical enterprise directed to acquire moral virtue.
This intrinsic insufficiency of norm-based ethics results in its inadequacy in guiding our actions both in global business and in a plural society. In particular, I argue that minimalist ethics is not best suited for a pluralist society, for the simple reason that it doesn’t take pluralism seriously. By trying to reduce artificially the differences among people, minimalist ethics reveals a certain fear for serious controversy. That is why minimalist ethics tends to favour a politically correct discourse instead of genuine speech. 
On the contrary, virtue-based ethics tends to foster the search for the good, and a serious dialogue about this matter. Having different ideas about the good in a given situation is not a problem insofar as the search for real good is something we all have in common. If this condition is fulfilled, we can engage in a serious dialogue with others, which is an ordinary means to contrast, enlarge, and perhaps rectify our particular visions about ethical matters.

To expose the argument, I will depart from a classical statement of Aristotle about the nature of ethics, noting the difficulties it raises for a modern reader. It is in this context that, in a simpler way than Thomas Hill in his article on Kantian Pluralism​[12]​, I distinguish two broad senses of “ethical pluralism”: epistemological and existential pluralism. Focusing on the latter, I address the topic of the insufficiency of minimalist ethics in the context of a plural society, and, subsequently, the adequacy of virtue ethics. In this context, I refer to “authenticity” as a feature in which we can hold together the respect for autonomy which minimalist ethics tries to protect, and the search for the good, implicit in virtue ethics. I close my paper with come remarks that in a way synthesize the  main points of my exposition. 


2. Modern objections to a classical statement about the nature of ethics

A good way to enter into our topic is to recall the three factors that Aristotle takes into account when speaking about “becoming good.” "Now some think that we are made good by nature, others by habituation, others by teaching," (NE X, 9, 1179b 20-21). We know his position as well: to become good, rational instruction does not suffice, for ethics is not a purely speculative discipline but a practical one.  Hence the importance Aristotle accords to (good) habits; so much so that he deemed them an essential prerequisite for attendance to his ethics classes.  In his view, in order to profit from these classes, one must first have been guided by good habits (NE 1, 4).  Thus, the actual experience of the good life is an important component of the preparation for ethics. Whoever lives well is already acquainted with the content of morality.  Such a person is not far from the knowledge of moral principles.  If he is not already familiar with them, he will not be long in discovering them; for indeed he already practices them constantly.

2. 1. But can we speak of  good morals?

As illuminating as it invariably is to hear Aristotle's views, his approach nonetheless leaves us a bit perplexed - and for two reasons.  First of all, he speaks as if all of us know what it means to be good.  But perhaps that knowledge is not so easily attained in our present situation, and perhaps even the very meaning of "being good" is not nearly as clear to us as it seems to have been to him.
The reason for the perplexity Aristotle's views produce in us is well expressed in a famous essay by Walker Percy, entitled "Novel-writing in an apocalyptic time."​[13]​  This American novelist draws our attention to the vast difference between the work of authors who, like Jane Austen or Tolstoy, were writing at a historical moment marked by a moral universe common to all (both authors and readers), and the contemporary author - Percy himself is a fine example - who no sooner sets to work than he realizes that such a universe no longer exists.​[14]​

We live - so everyone says - in a multicultural, pluralistic society, where ethical consensus is apparently reduced to a minimum, which excludes ideas of the good life. At any rate, if one had to point to a question on which consensus does exist, it would be precisely the conviction that each person is autonomous, the master of his own life, which is his to arrange as he sees fit, regardless of the views of others.  Were it not for this conviction, laboriously acquired over the course of modernity, unquestionably constituting an essential component of our particular ethos, we in the West would not be facing the problem of social pluralism in the terms in which we now express it: namely, how to achieve the goal of respecting a plurality of lifestyles within a common political framework?

Implicit is the idea that all of these different lifestyles, insofar as they are the expression of individual freedom, are, in principle, worthy of respect - since they fulfill a moral demand to which Charles Taylor has drawn attention, and which is deeply rooted in the modern ethos: the demand of authenticity.​[15]​  However, as we know, Taylor himself has pointed out the need to avoid interpreting this term in an individualistic sense, by showing what essential roles relations with others and with one's own tradition play in configuring one's identity.  Here, in its essence, is the debate between communitarians and liberals.

For our purposes, the relevant point is that either from a liberal or a communitarian perspective, Aristotle's approach is by no means problem-free.  While he has no difficulty in appealing to "the good man” he seems to take for granted that everybody knows who this man is.  How can we accept this perspective in a society like our own, where cultural and personal diversity is so extensive?  Is not the definition of good man relative to the diversity of cultures?

2.2.   But aren't there other concepts of ethics?

The approach - not so much Aristotelian as ancient in general - also leaves us perplexed about a second element.  For it assumes that the end of ethics is the learning of virtue, and this, too - to our ears - sounds somewhat problematic.  For in modern ethics, for instance, many people thing that the mission of ethics is to teach people to make the right decisions, with no mention of virtue.  One might of course object that it is impossible to make a right decision without having first trained practical reason through the virtue of prudence: that is, without having acquired some degree of moral virtue.  But then there arises the thorny question of how to become prudent in the first place, for how can anyone become good without making right decisions?  Besides, one might even ask when a decision is "right," ethically speaking.  When it is universalizable, as Kant would have it?  When it produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number, as utilitarians contend?  Or perhaps when it effects the best balance of our actions' positive and negative consequences? - Although here as well we run into the problem of which ones are positive and which ones are negative.  Moreover ( as if this were not enough), one could still object that the evaluation of a decision as good or bad depends upon the notions of the good peculiar to each culture, so that ethics itself is dissolved into cultural anthropology.

2. 3. The double meaning of the expression “ethical pluralism”: existential and epistemological

If the mere mention of all this confusion suffices to illustrate the complexity of our topic, it also allows us to point out the ambiguity of the term "ethical pluralism," something that must be kept in mind, given its inevitable effect on one's approach to ethics. 
Thus, in what we might call its "existential" sense, the expression refers to the plurality of lifestyles: this is the ordinary meaning, the one Walker Percy employs when speaking ironically of "apocalyptic times."  On the other hand, in a more epistemological sense, "ethical pluralism" refers to the variety of moral theories or  moral philosophies.

The most logical approach to throwing light on the teaching of ethics would be to begin with the epistemological question and then elucidate (insofar as possible) the very nature of ethics.  This path, however, would lead us too far astray and prevent us from addressing what we all (practically speaking) consider the main priority: the pluralism of lifestyles, with the problems this entails on both the level of peaceful coexistence and that of finding common ground on which to build our ethical discourse and lay the foundations for teaching ethics, in the classical sense: the doctrine of the fulfilled life.

 Clearly, in selecting this aspect I will have no choice but to presuppose a certain concept of ethics, at the expense of others.  I wish to note here, though, that this particular "concept of ethics" is not just one "theoretical construct" among many.  Its epistemological status is not that of the social sciences, but that of philosophy. This means that my main concern while doing ethics is not to construct a model in order to explain the rationality of human action; rather, I assume that human action can be more or less rational, and that its rationality is of a peculiar kind: not theoretical, but practical. To speak of practical reason is to speak of reason seeking to introduce order in our actions, so that, despite the plurality of our objectives and desires, our life can be unitary. In the same way, practical reason tries to find out what makes for an harmonious and coherent coexistence of different lives -without thereby violating one's own, or another's freedom.  Just how practical reason does this is what ethics, and practical philosophy in general, seeks to investigate.  But that this "joining" is what practical reason does, or at least endeavours to do, is beyond doubt.

At issue, then, is nothing less than an investigation of how to go about achieving a fulfilled life in a pluralistic society.  Choosing this point of departure will require us to broaden the horizons of our considerations and to recall that ethics is a political discipline. Reflection on what it is that makes a life good is by no means foreign to reflection on what it is that makes coexistence something greater than an exercise in mutual forbearance, i.e., a place where there is room for what is truly human to unfold.


3.	The inadequacy of minimalist ethics in a pluralistic society

Indeed, when we speak of a pluralistic society in a context like this one, we are endeavouring to throw some light on how to remove the obstacles to coexistence which pluralism can indeed present - while avoiding both totalitarianism and sectarianism.  What we seek, then, is to take into political consideration the real possibility of every person approaching his life in the way that seems best to him, regardless of others’ reactions.

As I indicated earlier, consensus on this point is accounted for by approval of the proposition that every person deserves respect for his autonomy. This is a value that any modern person would probably be disposed to defend even at the price of increased social unrest.  True, when that unrest evolves into open conflict, it is easy to reflect that, after all, being autonomous is not our sole aim in life.  But this in itself does not constitute an objection to the value of personal autonomy.  The highest values are not always the most urgent ones: survival may, at a given moment, be more urgent than performing an act of generosity but there is no doubt that, absolutely speaking, the latter is more noble.

In this context, it is a curious fact that in recent years it has been the perception of unrest - cultural malaise - rather than open conflict which has chiefly led to the well-known rehabilitation of communitarian thought.  In various ways, this movement has sought to recall that in real life man is not an autonomous subject; that in shaping his identity the contacts established with others come decisively into play, so that one's approach to his own life cannot be conceived of as emerging unhindered from a pure, original individuality.

At any rate, communitarian reflections still serve as a corrective to the dominant liberal discourse which places individual autonomy above all else.  For although liberal thought in recent years has indeed echoed the observations of communitarian-style thinkers, in practice the liberal worldview continues in the direction of supporting a few minimal ethical guidelines in the public square - tolerance and human rights - and relegating  substantive differences to private life.

By projecting this worldview onto social life, liberal thought claims to meet the chief challenge that contemporary practical philosophy has posed for today's pluralistic society: to bring together diverse lifestyles within a common political framework.  This challenge, incidentally, assumes unprecedented dimensions if, leaving behind the level of national policy, we ponder the social effects of a globalized economy.  For, assuming for a moment that such an economy tends by itself to promote a certain social uniformity, liberal proposal could apparently meet the challenge of combining moral (minimal) universality and cultural particularity. To establish those minima moralia, according to Donaldson, deontological or consequentialist approaches would be preferable than perfectionist standards of behaviour.​[16]​

I wish to note that minimalist approach rests on a tacit assumption, namely, that diversity represents a menace. And I wish to challenge this view by asking two questions: does ethical pluralism really pose such a threat to social stability?  And is the solution that liberal thought proposes - along the lines of an ethical minimalism or proceduralism - the only possible answer?

Pluralism of the kind described above need not, in my opinion, lead to the social unrest and fragmentation reflected in so much of contemporary literature and practical philosophy.  True, it seems evident that a strong tendency in this direction is inherent in ethical pluralism - as soon as discussion of what makes a life valuable is deemed an affair of each individual's private domain, something each person ought to determine alone.  This would place enormous restrictions on the possibility of contrasting with any profundity our opinions or lifestyle with those of others, thereby forfeiting the chance to improve our own.  

The point is that defending each person's opportunity to live as he chooses - as seems best to him - does not mean that some ways of life are not better than others; and certainly, it does not contradict the undeniable fact that, especially when it comes to lifestyles, we all have a powerful desire to "get it right.” It is true, in other words, that everyone follows what seems good to him, but not true that people generally prefer apparent goods to real ones.

Clearly, the apparent good may be more attractive under certain circumstances, and from certain points of view, but in general, human being as a rational animal, is also an animal of realities. He or she requires rational dialogue with others in order to clarify his/hers ideas about the nature of the good.  Precisely for this reason, the relegation of ethical discourse to the private sphere - when it is precisely dialogue about these issues that throws the most light on the proper way to live - is, at the least, a remarkable miscalculation.

Today, this error is echoed by every approach that makes ethical neutrality the ticket of access to public life.  And in the same way, often enough, the defence of social pluralism is linked - it is not clear why - to an odd restriction of ethical discourse itself, one that comes into force as soon as a person leaves his family circle and dons the hat of a public figure.  It seems, indeed, that once someone enters the public square, respect for abstract plurality demands that one keeps silent about his or her own concrete, personal convictions, making room for a presumably "objective" and "ethically neutral" discourse.  The effects of this state of affairs are all the more lamentable inasmuch as, due to the natural unity of practical reason, the attitude we adopt in our public behaviour inevitably tends to spread into the sphere of personal relations.

The fact is, any pretension to ethical neutrality is pure artifice, for human beings are ethical by nature: we are always confronted to choose acting in this or that way.  Hence, the pretension of ethical neutrality, to the extent that it artificially silences other human dimensions, tends by itself to favour a certain style of human relations, one marked by self-seeking.  The logic of this process is simple: urged on by the desire not to offend anyone in his or her convictions - as if these could not be subject to revision or improvement, and as if contrast could not provide the guidance for such change - we avoid all subjects that we imagine controversial.  We make our pact to limit public discourse to those matters upon which we can agree, which - besides tolerance and respect for abstract plurality - are the questions that concern the desire to live (not to live rightly) - in other words, the concerns we have in common insofar as we are all animals.  Reason and words - which according to Aristotle exist to speak of the just and the unjust, the useful and the harmful - are conspicuous by their absence, or else are employed merely as a device for satisfying one's vital interests in a more sophisticated fashion.

This is how we have come to speak of nothing but money or corruption, while public discourse is gradually emptied of the human references that would help to bestow meaning on personal action.  For it is clear that words which find no resonance in public life can only shed light on one's personal existence with difficulty.  And inversely: the dominant categories of public life easily come to constitute the only reference points for those who know of no other, because of whatever life circumstances they may have.  This is how a logic of instrumentality can ultimately be imposed on even the most personal of relations, so that each individual ends up seeking his own interest, without anything that could be called an authentic common good.  

 Common goods - replaced by competing individual interests, often concealed beneath the rhetoric of rights - are the great unspoken in our ethical discourse.  True, the political "common good" has always met with the suspicion that "reasons of state" inspire. Besides that misgiving, though, the chief reason for the common good's absence from our discourse lies in the difficulty liberal individualism has in grasping the true nature of common goods.  These cannot be conceived of as simple aggregates of individual goods, or as the mere end result of competition among private interests: After all, in contrast to the case of money and goods necessary for survival - which diminish when shared, thereby generating a competition of interests - common goods are enjoyed only when, and in the measure that, they are shared.  Perhaps this is why the clearest paradigm of the common good is the feast.

On the political level, the common good exists when the citizens perform some action in common.  The crucial question, then, is: What is it that can be done in common in a pluralistic society?  On this point - and to distinguish our thought clearly from the totalitarian impulse that accompanies republicanism of Rousseauian-Marxist inspiration - what must be emphasized is the practical nature of the common political good. It is not the previous identification of the private will with the general, abstract will that constitutes the common good, but rather the public confluence of different opinions which, despite their diversity, have one thing in common: a desire for what is best for the community.

In this context it is not superfluous to insist upon the enormous importance of public opinion, pointing out, with Hannah Arendt, the implicit absurdity of a single, monolithic, seamless public opinion.​[17]​  Public opinion, by definition, can only be an expression of the plurality of voices that enter public dialogue.  It is, then, primarily, a question of conversing, of contrasting opinions about how we ought to approach something we clearly do have in common: the problems of coexistence.

Accustomed as we are to instrumental rationality, we have transferred this style of thinking to political activity itself, and have come to believe that all that matters in the political realm is results.  In so doing we forget that politics is not technology but praxis. Results may have their importance but the way through which we attain them is crucial.  And many times this way involves conversation, serious dialogue.  This is how Aristotle justifies the idea of man's political nature, pointing out that he is endowed with words so as to be able to speak of justice and injustice.  We do this naturally.  But that naturalness is threatened when - whether with the excuse of a peculiar respect for the autonomy of others, or the appeal to the supposed moral duty to identify oneself with the general will - the artifice of ethical neutrality is imposed upon us as soon as we step into the street.  Having arrived at this point, liberalism and Rousseauian republicanism travel hand in hand.

In my opinion, if the phantasm of neutrality were to cease exerting its powerful influence over the minds of citizens, ethical pluralism would not have to lead to social fragmentation.  This was the view of that great liberal, Tocqueville, who attentively observed American political life.  Tocqueville understood that American individualism would constitute no serious threat to social cohesion as long as the citizens continued making use of their political freedoms -i.e., as long as they continued their active participation in public life.   

The American political experience, it seems to me, is an enlightening reference point for questions of pluralism.  When I speak of  that experience I do not refer solely to American political institutions - as extraordinarily effective as these have shown themselves to be in welcoming people of remarkably diverse origin. Rather, I mean the habits of political participation that Tocqueville found to admire in the United States around 1830, the expression of a republicanism entirely different from the Rousseauian brand, better understood in light of Aristotle, Montesquieu or the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment;​[18]​ a republicanism that leads each individual to feel that the public space is his or hers, and to protest wherever he perceives any infringement of his or her right to it.

To the degree that contemporary ethical pluralism means a radicalization of that individualism, the threat of social disintegration it could entail can be met with the same therapy: the exercise of political liberties, beginning with freedom of expression.  To this end it is essential to free oneself from the mental restrictions imposed by preoccupation with what is "politically correct"; otherwise, those problems which are on everyone's mind but which, out of concern for political correctness, no one will discuss, vanish from public opinion.  If we did not find it so hard to speak openly, from our own, personal perspective, of the difficulties that we believe affect our coexistence, ethical pluralism would cease to be a problem -  since we would be speaking of concrete realities, not of global visions of the world.  Almost without realizing it, we would be doing something together: working - each from his own point of view - towards the common good.  And it is only because this, after all, is what we are doing that society somehow remains unified.

There is always room for improvement - or for deterioration.  Deterioration occurs, for instance, when each one pursues by violent means the objectives that one deems right, from one’s (inevitably) limited perspective. In this connection it is germane to recall that if the common good categorically excludes anything, it excludes violence; for, as Hannah Arendt observes, violence excludes reason and words.​[19]​  This is why it is unacceptable to call war the continuation of parliamentary discussion by other means (Clausewitz). Anyone who would affirm this must conceive of politics as merely instrumental: technique, not action.  As technique, it must ultimately be the speciality of a few experts, placed in charge of liberating the rest of the citizens from the bothersome task of managing their own lives.
Since violence is the negation of politics, violent confrontation is excluded from the political arena, but verbal confrontation is not.  Far from it. The absence of controversy - a natural result of human plurality - would be the clearest indication of a lack of political vitality.  Moreover, authentic controversies, about substantial, and not merely procedural, issues, are just what is needed to reintroduce into public discourse the ethically meaningful references that would allow us to repopulate social space with attitudes and arguments other than the ones to which instrumental rationality has accustomed us.

Indeed, everyone must be aware that to foster such a dialogue we need more than words. We need a high degree of civic commitment and the practice of numerous virtues.  That said, we must make it clear that we are by no means claiming that political commitment automatically guarantees ethical conduct. Often enough - skeptical as we are - we are tempted to think just the opposite.  Nonetheless, it is evident that a country's political vitality is a clear sign that its people are not imprisoned within the sphere of private life, which in itself is an indication of ethical growth.  

Furthermore, if a particular citizen's political commitment is driven by the seeking of his or her own interests, that does not disqualify him or her, ethically speaking. The essential thing is that in seeking their interests, they refrain from violating the demands of justice and solidarity.  It is well to recall here that virtue is not one good among many but rather the appropriate way to pursue other goods - and that it therefore consists not in performing certain actions and avoiding others, but in performing actions in a certain way, without even stopping to ponder the possibility of performing others (the ones moral tradition recognizes as intrinsically evil).  It is not, in the final analysis, evil to pursue one's own interests, understood as the individual good.  We all do so.  What would be wrong would be to pursue them regardless of any other consideration.  The difference, thus, is between pursuing private interests in a just or in an unjust manner (for example, with the use of public funds).

Now, certainly, what is pertinent politically is not so much the intentions and feelings that inspire an action as the words spoken and the deeds accomplished.  But even here, it is obvious that both words and deeds, because of what they imply and reveal, require of all parties - those who govern, because they govern; those who are governed, because on them depends the very control of the government - something more than a minimalist ethics.  It requires an ethic of virtues.


	4.	A virtue ethics for a pluralistic society

In my view, what follows from this is that the notion of ethics that should be revived in the context of a pluralistic society is not minimalist ethics, but virtue ethics.  The drawback of this proposal is that, at least initially, it appears less appropriate to the multicultural character of our societies than a minimalist ethics.  I propose to show in what follows that, contrary to appearances, from a theoretical as well as a practical point of view, an ethics of virtue responds more satisfactorily to the demands of the contemporary ethos than does a minimalist ethics.

Moreover, it seems clear to me that even the values most prized by contemporary ethical discourse can withstand contact with reality only if they cease to be abstract values and are transformed into virtues.  Indeed, if tolerance is not viewed through this lens - as a virtue - it soon becomes merely a euphemism for a state of mutual indifference.  Likewise, if justice is not seen primarily as a virtue - a habit of our will, by which we choose, in a stable fashion, to render to each person his due, even when this renders against our own interests - then the term is reduced to legal proceduralism.   At any rate, not even an ethical minimalism would reign in the public square.  For ethics would not reign at all: other things would.  Either tolerance and justice are virtues or, as far as ethics is concerned, they are nothing at all.

If tolerance and justice are to be seen as virtues, which would mean being incorporated as stable attitudes, something beyond argument is needed.  Once we arrive at this point, the fundamental difficulty of the teaching of ethics becomes the one Plato addressed, and Solomon​[20]​ reminds us: Can virtue be taught?  Can people be taught to be good?  To this question, I believe Aristotle's answer - that one needs nature, reason and habits​[21]​ to be good - has the merit of offering us both an answer to this question and a key to grasping fully the change wrought in modern moral philosophy.

For if, as so many maintain, modern moral philosophy is rationalistic, then mindfulness of Aristotle's answer helps us to understand better what it is that such rationalism consists of: the aspiration to make moral philosophy a science like other sciences, with insistence above all on the function of argumentative rationality, at the expense of nature and habits.

This vision of ethics - present above all in rationalistic thinkers - was severely criticized by Hume, who rightly acknowledged the insufficiency of theoretical reason on the level of practical motivation.  Hence, Hume himself opted for an ethics of good sentiments, persuaded as he was of reason's incompetence in practical matters, of its instrumental role regarding what to his judgment was the only possible source of motivation: the passions.

Kant's objection to this approach is well known, as is his intent to recover the practical character of reason.  However, all that was left for Kant to do, once he had expelled nature from morality's domain, was to constitute pure reason as something immediately applicable, taking duty to be the original moral datum.  Ever since then, Kantian-inspired ethics has had to face repeatedly the objection formulated by "teleological ethics,” namely, its incapacity to explain moral motivation.

Teleological ethics, which inherited from Hume a concept of reason as purely instrumental, has had to be defended against the objection that deontologists (among others) level at it.  They contend that by reducing practical reason to instrumental reason, teleological ethics exhibits a forceful tendency to overlook the intrinsically evil character of certain actions, and thus to instrumentalize man and woman for ends that are often abstract.

At any rate, aside from the criticisms that advocates of each position direct at each other, both have one thing in common. Both reduce ethics to its rational dimension, giving priority to the method employed to discover ethical norms, and forgetting thereby that an abstract knowledge of the norms is by no means enough when we come to the real life. Indeed, they tend to forget that the teaching of ethics cannot be reduced to mere rational instruction, but must take nature and habits into account as well.

It would assuredly be useful here to distinguish between the practical-existential level, the locus of conduct, and the philosophical-practical one, the level proper to ethics as a discipline with its place in the academic world.  It is helpful to make this distinction, for it seems obvious that, as an academic discipline, ethics cannot go beyond rational instruction since, among other reasons, it would amount to undue interference in the conduct of others.  This fact, however, should not induce us to forget that philosophical ethics is itself a disputed discipline, accused of an unbridled tendency to reflect upon its own presuppositions. Precisely because it does so reflect, it is entitled to broach the idea of the need to accompany rational instruction with behaviour that incorporates the principles of moral reasoning: what Aristotle finds in the good man.

Still, the question of the recognition of the good man remains hanging in the air.  Can we, after all, establish universally who will be taken as a good man in every situation and culture?

The answer - the obvious answer - is No. It is, in any case, true that the ideal of good man varies from one culture to another.  Ethics, in other words, is incorporated into cultures.  Nonetheless, the identification of some traits, and not others, as "good" in the context of any culture conforms to the same principles.  This is a philosophical proposition which, precisely because it is a first principle, does not admit of direct empirical demonstration.  But it can be argued for by adopting what Spaemann calls a "pragmatic-transcendental" view, a kind of counter-factual proof: it is obvious that a denial of certain practical principles common to all men, to the extent that it amounted to a negation of the unity of human nature, would self-evidently contradict the expectations that we manifest again and again in practice when we persist in seeking to deal with human beings from other cultures and to establish community with them - or when we deem it a failure if we fall short of doing so.

Well and good: but what are these principles?  Not "human rights," or any abstract values, but the ends of the various virtues which, as Thomas Aquinas puts it, are known by means of a natural habit called "synderesis."  This habit operates on the level of action analogously to the way in which the principle of non-contradiction operates on the theoretical level.  As the habitual knowledge of this principle enables us to recognize a contradiction as we speak or listen to another's discourse, so also synderesis allows us, as acting individuals, to recognize which of our actions contradict the good of man. 

Clearly, to the extent that the human good - exemplified in the good man - appears different in various cultures, moral perception will differ in each individual.  But these distinct modes of perception of the human good do not constitute a diversity of the principles of virtues, since in the end these are not modes of action - which may indeed vary with cultures, but which in the last analysis are translations of the same dispositions in the agent.  Gratitude or generosity may have varying manifestations in different cultures, and it is the task of socio-cultural anthropology to render such manifestations decipherable to the eyes of the Western observer.  But gratitude and generosity are dispositions that perfect man, whatever his culture may  be.

In this connection it is well to remember that, as etymology suggests, "culture" refers to the cultivation of nature, not its destruction.  Hence, to affirm that human nature is cultural is not to equate culture and morality; it simply means that in each culture the perception of the good of man follows a particular outline - just as, within a single culture, people of differing temperaments approach the same matter in distinct ways.

I realize that by introducing an appeal to nature at this point I have opened Pandora's box, and cannot avoid saying something about the subject. "Nature" is perhaps the concept most reviled by modern moral philosophy: so much so that one is tempted to do without it. Forgetting nature, however, would be a terrible mistake in any case, but especially in the present one: for if there is no nature, morality is merely conventional, and there is no way to distinguish education from manipulation.

That said, I will limit myself to indicating that by "nature" I mean what Aristotle meant by "órexis": desire, appetite - including both the tendencies and inclinations which man shares with other beings and those which are specific to him.  As is well known, Thomas Aquinas makes use of a similar classification of natural inclinations to develop his doctrine of natural law in the celebrated second article of question 94 of the Summa Theologica.   In the context of this work, however, I do not wish to continue in this direction, since a proper understanding of St. Thomas' approach would require more time than is available to us.  Instead, I would like to draw attention to the concept of nature understood as appetite, and to show its relationship to another Aristotelian concept: "natural virtue," as opposed to "moral virtue.”  

Thus, when Aristotle speaks of natural virtue it may be understood as a natural disposition to perform a certain kind of good action: there are, for instance, people who "naturally" tend to be orderly.  Left to their own devices they immediately begin to organize everything they come across.  Being orderly is not, perhaps, the most common trait among men and women; still, all of us - some more than others - possess some natural virtues. However, if reason's guidance is lacking, the natural virtues can by themselves be harmful – they can even change the very nature of an act.  Thus, a person who fails to use reason to gauge the circumstances in which he finds himself may, moved by an impulse of generosity,  in fact commit an act of extravagance or injustice.  For it is how an act is put into practice that determines its real definition. Now, the enactment is not the result of pure nature but the effect of the intervention of reason on natural disposition.  When this intervention takes place - and it can, for our sensitive nature is susceptible to rational influence - the moral disposition already present in us via synderesis truly has room to become effective, and shapes our character, perfecting it with moral virtue.  

"Neither by nature, then," says Aristotle, "nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit." (NE, II, 1, 1103 a 24-26).  Because such an aptitude exists, moral formation is not manipulation but the actualization of potentialities.  It is the process by which a man becomes a good man, whatever his culture may be - no matter how variously the modes of virtuous action - gratitude, generosity, hospitality, etc. - are manifested in each culture - and no matter how the perception of the good of man tends to emphasize some modes over others. If a culture is to be coherent, it must, like an individual, be attentive to the harmonious integration of various human dimensions, and must do so in a way that fosters the growth of persons.

Advocating virtue ethics in the context of a society like our own is at least as respectful of cultural plurality than minimalist ethics could be.  Indeed, I would say it is more so: for whereas minimalist ethics, under the guise of neutrality, in fact favours a public square monopolized by instrumental rationality, virtue ethics seeks to promote human growth from within, fostering the strengthening - also from within - of whatever culture is in question, without discrimination of any kind.  Virtue ethics favours cultural diversity precisely inasmuch as it rests on the acceptance of the natural foundation that forms the basis of the coherence of any culture and seeks, from this point of departure, the growth of the persons who share a lifestyle.

Assuming this natural basis - which means excluding, as incompatible with virtue, those acts known as intrinsically evil - virtue ethics, at least as understood by some of us, indirectly adopts the classical doctrine of natural law, but avoids its most normative formulations and underlines its practicality.  In this way we also find ourselves well situated to support the ideal of authenticity which is at the heart of the contemporary ethos, an ideal that seeks to do justice to the singularity and unrepeatability of each person's own existence.  Those who pursue this ideal are not content with appeals to an abstract morality and would logically be quite disappointed with the reduction of morality to a set of abstract principles.

Now, to be authentic, it is not sufficient to second the voice of nature - particularly when that voice reverberates in our ears in terms as ambiguous or contradictory as the echoes of it found in Rousseau.  To be authentic, one must, instead, act in accordance with the truth one knows, but without forgetting that our knowledge of the truth is progressive, occurs within time, and is often nourished by the experience of error.  Here we owe to Inciarte his observation that speaking of "right reason" is by no means redundant, since the rectitude of reason in the area of the practical consists precisely of the continual effort to correct oneself: right reason is correct reason, corrected along the way.​[22]​

The ideal of authenticity can and should be associated with the image of truth-seeking man. This image does justice simultaneously to the historical and to the metahistorical character of human life (and which, not coincidentally, plays such a fundamental role in Walker Percy's major novel, The Moviegoer). 

In times like our own - on the one hand pluralistic, on the other marked by cultural syncretism (and to that extent homogeneous) - it is easy for traditional reference points to enter into crisis, simply because the cultural tradition behind them has done the same.  These are confused times, but also times in which the very contrast between diverse elements invites us continually to redefine our identity in terms that are most congruent with the new situation.





I summarize here the main points of my exposition. 

One of the ethical challenges arising from our present situation of global business and ethical pluralism can be summarized in the double question I presented at the outset: is it possible to expand business while respecting cultural diversity? To what extent is ethical pluralism compatible with globalization of business? 

My answer to the first question is positive, as long as we notice that business is a practice exerted by moral agents and inserted in moral contexts, and therefore subject not only to economic criteria, but to moral criteria as well. However, we should refrain from reducing these moral criteria to extrinsic norms of the kind proposed by ethical minimalists. I have said that ethical norms are necessary but in no way sufficient to guide our actions. In order to act well we need not only norms but also moral virtue. Moral virtue is necessary both to discern which action is required in these precise circumstances, and to implement the action. 

This presupposed, I have said that moral virtue respects and promotes cultural diversity in so far as it promotes human growth from within the human agent, in his or her particular context. However, it avoids relativism in so far as moral virtue, beyond the different cultural modes it can adopt, rests on the same moral principles: every culture values generosity, although each one reflects this value in a different way. On the contrary, minimalist ethics tend to gain universality through abstraction, formulating principles which remain unpractical as long as they are not incorporated by virtue. 

Moreover, since virtue is the key concept in every theory of the good life –that is, what makes a life valuable-, it is the focus on virtues and not merely in norms which can prevent us from the supposedly homogeneity resulting from economic globalization. The reason is that economy, by its very nature, fails to transcend the issue of merely living. By itself has nothing to tell us about what makes a life valuable or good. Consequently, the prevalence of economy in a society represents the prevalence of survival criteria over criteria about the good life.  If we don’t stress the criteria referring to the good life, cultural homogeneity, in line with an economic culture, i.e, a culture of survival or a material culture, is unavoidable. 

As regards pluralism within our societies, virtue ethics has also much more to offer than minimalism. For minimalist ethics has a theoretical approach to ethical pluralism. It tends to see the social risks of ethical pluralism and tries to overcome them by speaking of a moral minimum. I think that this approach is mistaken. It rests on several arguable assumptions: 1) it assumes a static view of ethics, forgetting that human beings can change their views over time, and they often do when they find something better; 2) it assumes an anti-social vision of ethics, forgetting that human beings often seek the truth by speaking with their fellow men and women; 3) assuming a theoretical and epistemological approach, minimalist ethics tends to present itself as a technical knowledge, forgetting  that ethics is not primarily a matter of experts but a human matter, and therefore quite democratic; 4) as a consequence, minimalist ethics tends to artificially exclude, both from the public arena and from organizations, a serious dialogue about ethical issues. Instead they favour the language of the “politically correct.”
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